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A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF QUEBEC V. A.: 
EVALUATING THE SUPREME COURT’S 
DIVIDED OPINION ON SECTION 15 AND 




This paper is a case comment of Quebec v. A. In Quebec v. A., the 
Supreme Court of Canada tackled a Charter challenge to the Civil 
Code of Quebec. The claimant, A., alleged that the legislation 
violated her section 15 equality rights by discriminating on the basis 
of marital status in excluding common law couples from spousal 
support and division of property upon separation. The Court 
delivered a lengthy, controversial, and divided decision with three 
lines of dissent. Ultimately, the exclusion was upheld. Quebec 
continued to exclude common law couples from the division of 
property and remained the sole province to deny common law 
couples spousal support upon separation. This paper uses feminist 
theories of substantive equality to evaluate each of the four major 
judicial opinions in Quebec v. A., highlighting the ways in which 
women in common law relationships are more adversely affected by 
exclusion from the support regime than men. It does so to argue that 
striking down Quebec’s exclusion of common law couples from both 
spousal support and the division of property, as per Abella J.’s 
dissent, is more in keeping with feminist theories of substantive 
equality.  
 
 This paper critiques the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
and reasoning in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A. from a feminist 
perspective. It does so by measuring the judicial opinions in Quebec 
v. A. against the standard of feminist theories of substantive equality. 
In Quebec v. A., the Court upheld the exclusion of unmarried 
cohabitants from the Quebec legislative scheme on spousal support 
and the division of property as justifiable discrimination on the 
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ground of marital status under section 15(1) of the Charter.1 The 
decision was controversial for its divided opinions and three lines of 
dissent,2 its alleged reinvention of the discrimination analysis under 
section 15(1),3 and the way it perpetuated disadvantaging women 
more than men in common law relationships.  
 
 This paper is divided into two parts. The first section explains 
which feminist theories of substantive equality are used as an 
external standard in this paper and why. It then outlines the facts and 
judicial history of Quebec v. A. The second section analyzes the 
judicial opinions of Justices LeBel, McLachlin, Abella, and 
Deschamps. It does so to demonstrate that Abella J.’s analysis and 
decision under section 15(1) better responds to feminist theories of 
substantive equality than that of her colleagues. Although the Court 
in Quebec v. A. proceeded to a section 1 analysis, this paper focuses 
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1  Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5.  
2  Carissima Mathen, “The Upside of Dissent in Equality Jurisprudence” 
(2013) 63 SCLR (2d) 111.  
3  Jennifer Koshan & Jonnette Watson Hamilton, “The Continual Reinvention 
of Section 15 of the Charter” (2013) 64 UNBLJ 19.  
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CONTEXT 
 
FEMINIST THEORIES OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY 
USED IN THIS PAPER 
 
Unlike formal equality—which grants equal rights and treatment 
before the law—theories of substantive equality argue that equal 
treatment does not always produce equal benefits or outcomes for 
members of disadvantaged groups.4 Disadvantaged groups may be 
defined as those who face systemic discrimination. Feminist 
theorists such as Hester Lessard and Catharine MacKinnon argue 
that formal equality may be insufficient to produce equal outcomes 
for those of disadvantaged groups because it is characterized by a 
fiction of equal access to benefits provided by neutral laws.5 In this 
regard, formal equality assumes the sameness of experiences of 
individuals when doing so may not be appropriate. Instead, 
substantive equality demands a more contextualized approach to 
equality. A contextualized approach is one which recognizes that 
systemic inequalities faced by historically disadvantaged claimants 
pose a barrier to equal access and protection.6 Substantive equality 
requires analyzing the impact of equal treatment on claimants.  
 
 Vanessa Munro argues that the concept of formal equality is 
flawed from a feminist perspective.7 It presumes that society is equal 
                                                 
4  Colleen Sheppard, “Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” in Christine LM Boyle et al, 
eds, Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at 
196.  
5  Judy Fudge, “The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the 
Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles” 
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ at 495.  
6  Ibid at 496.  
7  Vanessa Munro, Law and Politics at the Perimeter: Re-Evaluating Key 
Debates in Feminist Theory (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 133.  
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and thus, equal treatment by the law is sufficient to provide 
individuals with equality in society.8 However, women may face 
barriers in society such as economic disadvantage or the pressure to 
conform to gender roles that prevent them from achieving equal 
treatment and equal benefits from the law.9 In the context of Quebec 
v. A., women may experience the impact of the exclusion of 
unmarried cohabitants from the support regime differently than men. 
This is because women constitute a group of historically 
disadvantaged claimants;10 the barriers women face in society affect 
the ways in which they are impacted by neutral laws.  
 
 This paper uses feminist theories of substantive equality to 
evaluate the Court’s reasoning in Quebec v. A. It does so because, 
since its first decision on section 15(1) equality rights in Andrews v. 
Law Society of British Columbia, the Supreme Court itself has 
emphasized a substantive approach to equality.11 This approach 
rejects mere sameness of treatment or formal equality in exchange 
for an effects-based analysis.12 Though the Court did not explicitly 
use the term “substantive equality” in Andrews, it described the 
approach as such in subsequent section 15(1) cases such as Withler 
v. Canada (Attorney General).13 The Charter explicitly references a 
goal of providing “equal benefit of the law” under section 15(1).14 
This reflects feminist theories of substantive equality in their 
                                                 
8  Ibid at 133. 
9  Ibid at 133. 
10  Supra note 6 at 532.  
11  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143.  
12  Kathleen E Mahoney, “The Constitutional Law Of Equality in Canada” 
(1992) 44 Me L Rev 229 at 244. 
13  2011 SCC 12 at para 2, [2011] 1 SCR 396.  
14  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
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emphasis on equal outcomes rather than treatment. For these 
reasons, feminist theories of substantive equality are used in this 
paper to measure the extent to which the Court’s decision and 
reasoning in Quebec v. A. meet that goal. 
 
FACTS OF QUEBEC V. A.  
 
B was a 32-year-old businessman who began a relationship with A 
when she was 17. Their relationship lasted ten years, over which 
time they had three children. A was the primary caregiver to their 
children. Over the course of their relationship, B became a 
billionaire and icon in the Quebec business community.15 Though A 
wanted to get married, B refused stating that he did not believe in the 
institution of marriage.16 After separating, A demanded spousal 
support and division of property.  
 
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF QUEBEC V. A.  
 
A brought a claim against B and the Attorney General of Quebec 
using section 15(1) of the Charter. A argued that provisions of the 
Civil Code of Quebec made a discriminatory distinction based on the 
analogous ground of marital status by distinguishing between 
unmarried and married cohabitants. She claimed that it did so by 
excluding unmarried cohabitants from its spousal support and 
property regime.  
 
 At the Superior Court, Hallée J. held that the impugned 
provisions did not violate A’s equality rights under section 15(1).17 
                                                 
15  Shantona Chaudhury & Nicolas M Rouleau, “When Equality, Autonomy 
and Politics Collide: Unpacking Eric v. Lola” (2013) 32 Advocates’ Soc J 
No 2 at 3.  
16  Ibid. 
17  Droit de la famille – 091768, 2009 QCCS 3210, [2009] JQ no 7153. 
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Hallée J. discussed the purpose of the section 15(1) provisions,18 
deciding that the provisions excluded common law couples from the 
regime in order to protect their choice.19 She held that common law 
couples make a choice to remain outside the regime by not getting 
married.20 She found that this was the purpose behind the provisions’ 
distinction between married and unmarried cohabitants.21 Hallée J. 
cited Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh22 as precedent for 
considering choice as part of a legislative purpose at section 15(1) in 
cases of support claims between spouses.23 Walsh was a previous 
section 15(1) case on post-separation division of property between 
unmarried cohabitants. In Walsh, the Court similarly declined to 
include unmarried cohabitants in the support regime by citing their 
choice to remain outside it by not getting married.24  
 
 At the Quebec Court of Appeal, Dutil J.A. allowed A’s appeal in 
part.25 She struck down the spousal support provisions, but held that 
the property provisions did not infringe section 15(1).26 At section 
15, Dutil J.A. divided her analysis of the spousal support and 
property provisions.27 She decided that the different objectives 
                                                 
18  Ibid at para 264. 
19  Ibid at para 222.  
20  Ibid at para 243. 
21  Ibid at para 276. 
22  Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 SCR 325 
[Walsh]. 
23  Supra note 18 at para 249. 
24  Walsh, supra note 18.  
25  Droit de la famille – 102866, 2010 QCCA 1978 at para 3, 89 RFL (6th) 1. 
26  Ibid at para 164.  
27  Ibid at para 67–68. 
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behind them, in protecting against economic vulnerabilities and 
decisions to accumulate property respectively, necessitated separate 
analyses.28 She found that the spousal support provisions violated 
section 15(1) by perpetuating both prejudice and stereotypes against 
common law couples. Dutil J.A. limited Walsh’s applicability in 
Quebec v. A.  to the analysis of the property provisions for two 
reasons. 29 First, in contrast to A’s claim for both property and 
support, Walsh dealt with only the division of property.30 Second, 
Walsh was decided under a jurisdiction in which common law 
couples were already eligible for spousal support upon separation. 
Thus, common law couples in that jurisdiction were less vulnerable 
than those completely excluded from both spousal support and 
property, such as A and B.31  
 
 In the decade prior to Quebec v. A., only three claimants 
successfully argued section 15(1) claims at the Supreme Court.32 Of 
the section 15 cases decided by the Court, it is unclear how many 
qualify as a victory for women’s equality. However, two cases 
brought by male claimants were successful in arguing sex equality 
claims.33 Lahey argues that when the Court awards women victories 
                                                 
28  Ibid.  
29  Ibid at 64. 
30  Ibid. 
31  Ibid at 66. 
32  Karen Busby, “Discussed, Reformulated and Enriched Many Times: The 
Supreme Court of Canada’s Equality Jurisprudence” (Paper delivered at the 
Canadian Bar Association Annual National Constitutional and Human 
Rights Conference, Ottawa, June 2014), [unpublished]. 
33  Ibid. 
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in equality claims, it does so using an “empty” concept of equality.34 
By empty equality, Lahey means one lacking a substantive approach 
or the recognition of men and women’s varied experiences.35 She 
argues that this represents a contradiction between the Court’s goal 
of substantive equality and its actual application of a more restricted 
notion of equality in section 15 cases.36 Prior to Quebec v. A., 
equality rights cases also involved a continual reinvention of the 
section 15(1) test. This ranged from a focus on discrimination in 
Andrews,37 to human dignity and a more formalized analysis of 
contextual factors in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and 
Immigration),38 to the use of prejudice and stereotyping as rigid 
categories of discrimination in R v. Kapp39 and Withler.40 Thus, 
Quebec v. A.  held the potential to explain the current form of the 
section 15(1) test, the reasons for the lack of success of section 15 





                                                 
34  Kathleen A Lahey, “Feminist Theories of (In)Equality” in Sheilah L Martin 
& Kathleen A Mahoney, eds, Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1987) 71 at 82.  
35  Ibid at 82. 
36 Ibid at 82. 
37  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at paras 33–
39. 
38  Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 
497 at paras 47–88, 170 DLR (4th) 1. 
39  2008 SCC 41 at paras 18–25, [2008] 2 SCR 483. 
40  Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 at paras 30–40, [2011] 
1 SCR 396. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDINGS AT 
SECTION 15(1) IN QUEBEC V. A. 
 
At the Supreme Court, B and the Attorney General appealed the 
lower court’s suspension of the spousal support provisions. A 
appealed the lower court’s decision of finding the property 
provisions valid. A 5:4 majority, including Abella J., Deschamps J. 
and McLachlin C.J. found a violation of section 15. In effect, the 
justices divided on gender lines with the women, plus Cromwell J., 
finding discrimination and proceeding to the section 1 analysis. 
LeBel J., representing the men, minus Cromwell J., wrote the dissent 
at section 15 which declined to find a violation. At section 1, the 
section 15 majority separated. McLachlin C.J. provided the swing 
vote to uphold the provisions at section 1. Below, this paper applies 
the standard of feminist theories of substantive equality to evaluate 
the Court’s reasoning.  
 
LEBEL J.’S DECISION 
 
In dissent at section 15, LeBel J. refused to find an infringement. He 
found that the provisions did not perpetuate prejudice or 
stereotyping.41 LeBel J. defined the test for discrimination at section 
15(1) as “the imposition of a disadvantage that is unfair or 
objectionable, which is most often the case if the disadvantage 
perpetuates prejudice or stereotypes.”42 Thus, he left open the 
possibility of finding disadvantage using other indicia. LeBel J. also 
recognized that prejudice may be inadvertent and unintentional.43  
 
 Though LeBel J. seemed to define the section 15(1) test as 
flexible and thus favourable to claimants, he applied a more rigid 
                                                 
41  Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 at para 281.  
42  Ibid at para 180. 
43  Ibid at para 251. 
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test. He used only prejudice and stereotyping as indicators of 
disadvantage and considered choice in his discrimination analysis at 
section 15(1). Similar to the Superior Court, LeBel J. cited the 
purpose of the provision as protecting the choice of common law 
couples to remain outside the regime by choosing not to marry.44 By 
considering choice, LeBel J. brought a justificatory analysis of the 
provisions’ purpose into section 15. By doing so, he shifted the 
burden to the claimant to prove the discriminatory nature of the 
legislative purpose. This would otherwise be the burden of the Court 
at section 1. In contrast, the majority at section 15 considered choice 
only at section 1. 
 
Critique of LeBel J.’s Reasoning  
 
LeBel J.’s section 15 analysis is lacking from the perspective of 
feminist theories of substantive equality because he seemed to apply 
only a formal notion of equality. In his analysis, he emphasized 
individualism, autonomy, non-intervention of the state into social 
relations, and choice. Sheppard notes that such notions correspond 
with a formal conception of equality.45 This is because such notions 
stem from liberal theories of equality in which formal equality is 
rooted.46  
 
 In his analysis, LeBel J. also assumed the sameness of men’s 
and women’s experiences of the exclusion. In this sense, his analysis 
corresponds with formal notions of equality because he did not 
consider how the exclusion may impact men and women differently. 
As Eberts notes, the standard of sameness is not always 
                                                 
44  Ibid at paras 214–251. 
45  Supra note 5 at 196–97.  
46  Ibid. 
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appropriate,47 such a type of formal equality—she argues—is 
inappropriate because it tends to accept the male experience as the 
norm.48 This norm becomes the experience that is expected or 
assumed of individuals. This may not be the case if women’s and 
men’s experiences are not the same. Assuming the male experience 
as the norm, formal equality also tends to benefit only those women 
who conform to or are capable of conforming to it.49 MacKinnon 
explains that, in this way, supposedly neutral laws sometimes benefit 
only those women who conform to the expected standard.50 Neutral 
laws, in this sense, disregard the disadvantages and systemic barriers 
that prevent women from benefiting from such laws51  
 
LeBel J. assumed the sameness of men’s and women’s 
experiences of exclusion in his discussion of alternatives to inclusion 
in the support regime. He held that common law couples already 
have access to remedies outside of the support regime, such as 
constructive trusts and cohabitation agreements, which can be used 
to protect their interests at separation, assuming that men and 
women in common law relationships have equal access to such 
remedies. However, this may not be the case if one partner is more 
economically vulnerable than the other and faces barriers to such 
remedies. Further, such remedies can be used to exploit a financially 
vulnerable partner. For example, the terms of a cohabitation 
agreement may be used as a bargaining chip against the cohabitant 
                                                 
47  Mary Eberts, “Sex and Equality Rights” in Anne F Bayeksky & Mary 
Eberts, eds, Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 183 at 221. 
48  Ibid at 218. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Catharine A MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and 
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) at 37.  
51  Ibid. 
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on matters of custody, access, and child support. Women in such 
relationships  are more likely to be financially dependent.52 They 
may fail to conform to standards of financial independence due to 
systemic barriers associated more with women’s experiences than 
those of men. Those women who are unable to conform to the norm 
of financial independence may thus experience access to alternative 
remedies differently than men. Exclusion from the regime may have 
the effect of leaving men and women with different degrees of 
access to the only remedies available to unmarried cohabitants.  
 
Further, LeBel J. presumes sameness of experience in his 
discussion of choice. He recognized that choice may not be 
deliberate if parties are unaware of the legal consequences of their 
status.53 In such cases, parties may not consciously choose to remain 
outside the regime, but may simply be unaware of their exclusion. 
LeBel J. refused to give judicial notice to such reasoning, stating that 
such facts remain in dispute.54 However, as Chaudhury and Rouleau 
note, according to a 2013 poll, 62% of Quebecers believe unmarried 
cohabitants are entitled to a division of property upon separation.55 
Further, 58% of Quebecers are unaware that unmarried cohabitants 
are not entitled to spousal support upon separation.56 These statistics 
are striking considering Quebec has more common law couples than 
any other province, but offers the least post-separation support. As 
Bakht notes, Quebec remains the only province in the country to 
                                                 
52  Anne Barlow & Rebecca Probert, “Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation: 
Changing Family Values and Policies in Europe and North America—An 
Introductory Critique” (2004) 26 Law & Pol’y 1 at 6. See also Catharine A 
MacKinnon, Sex Equality, 3d ed (USA: Foundation Press, 2016) at 658–
686. 
53  Supra note 2 para 274.  
54  Supra note 2 at page 12.  
55  Chaudhury and Rouleau supra note 16 at 8.  
56  Ibid. 
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exclude common law couples from spousal support regimes.57 Thus, 
though LeBel J. intended to give deference to the choice of common 
law couples to remain outside the regime, he may instead be giving 
deference to their ignorance.  
 
From the perspective of feminist theories of substantive equality, 
LeBel J.’s consideration of choice at section 15 is problematic for 
three reasons. First, LeBel J. considered choice when A’s financial 
vulnerability constrained her ability to make decisions and exercise 
choice. In effect, LeBel J. considered A’s supposed choice when she 
lacked the ability to choose to get married. A, like other spouses in 
similar situations, was economically vulnerable to B, who worked as 
the sole provider for the family and refused to get married. As 
Abella J. notes, choice for spouses in A’s situation may be illusory 
due to the power imbalance created by their spouse’s economic 
superiority.58 By protecting choice in such scenarios, the Court may, 
in effect, be protecting only the choice of the economically superior 
spouse (here B) who refuses to get married. By doing so, the Court 
implicitly endorses and reinforces the economically superior 
spouse’s power in the relationship. Munro notes that the law, in this 
way, can play a part in constructing gender norms.59 Here, the law 
seems to construct and further cement gender norms of a man’s 
superiority in the relationship by excluding A from the support 
regime and thus leaving her unprotected and financially dependent 
on B.  
 
The way in which LeBel J. assumed that both men and women 
are equally able to exercise choice in common law relationships 
                                                 
57  Natasha Bakht, “A v B and Attorney General of Quebec (Eric v Lola): The 
Implications for Cohabiting Couples Outside Quebec” (2012) 28 Can J 
Fam L 261.  
58  Supra note 2 at para 216. 
59  Munro, supra note 8 at 44.  
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reflects the sameness approach of formal equality. As Mahoney 
notes, those using the sameness approach compare women claimants 
of discrimination to men, even though women’s choices may be 
more constrained.60 When women are compared to men under this 
approach, “their opportunity to be treated as equal is limited to the 
extent that they are the same as men.”61 LeBel J. presumed that A 
and B, and men and women in common law relationships more 
generally, have equal abilities to exercise choice. As Sheppard notes, 
treating men and women equally in this way helps only those 
women who are able to emulate and conform to men’s experiences.62 
In effect, A suffered because she was unable to exercise choice as 
effectively as men who do not face the same barriers as women in 
common law relationships. As Sheppard notes, women in this way 
are blamed for their inability to achieve the male experience of 
choice and autonomy.63 
 
LeBel J.’s analysis can be criticized even if it is accepted that 
choice was not illusory for A. This is because it can be said that, in 
denying her claim, he still effectively punished A for her choice to 
remain outside the regime. Thus, A suffered even if it is accepted 
that she was able to exercise choice. As Young notes, choice is 
sometimes used to hold individuals responsible for their outcomes.64 
As she states, “when one makes the ‘wrong’ choice, one seemingly 
has no right.”65 In contrast, B benefited from his choice to remain 
outside marriage as he did not have to provide A with spousal 
                                                 
60  Mahoney, supra note 13 at 244. 
61  Ibid at 249. 
62  Sheppard, supra note 5 at 212.  
63  Ibid at 213. 
64  Margot Young, “Social Justice and the Charter: Comparison and Choice” 
(2013) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 669 at 14. 
65  Ibid. 
A Feminist Critique of Quebec v. A. 143 
support or property. In these ways, LeBel J.’s use of choice was 
problematic from feminist perspectives of substantive equality for 
failing to recognize women’s experiences of increased barriers to 
choice and autonomy than men.  
 
Second, LeBel J.’s consideration of choice is problematic for the 
way in which he used it to deny that the exclusion perpetuated 
stereotyping. LeBel J. defined stereotyping as basing a law on traits 
that do not relate to an individual’s “actual circumstances…needs, 
capacities, or merits.”66 He found that the exclusion responds to the 
actual circumstances of common law couples. He considered their 
actual circumstances as ones of choosing to remain outside the 
regime. However, it may be argued that LeBel J.’s analysis itself 
rested on stereotypes. This is because he presumed that A made a 
choice to remain unprotected by the regime. This is stereotypical if it 
was not her actual circumstance. It may thus be argued that LeBel J. 
stereotyped A and other common law spouses by considering choice 
to be their essential identifying feature. As an essential identifying 
feature, choice was generalized as a trait found in and available to all 
common law spouses. Watson Hamilton and Koshan note that 
identifying features are sometimes essentialized in this way. They 
note that stereotyping is a way of generalizing such essential 
identifying features.67 LeBel J. generalized the choice of common 
law couples by presuming that all cohabitants deliberately chose to 
remain outside the regime by not getting married. The way in which 
LeBel J. stereotyped choice as the essential identifying feature of 
common law claimants had the effect of eclipsing their actual 
circumstances. These circumstances may be that they are unable to 
exercise choice. Feminist theories of substantive equality would 
require considering these circumstances, especially in the context 
that women may face more barriers than men in exercising choice. 
                                                 
66  Supra note 2 at para 201.  
67   Koshan and Hamilton, supra note 4 at 5.  
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Instead, LeBel J. applied a more formal notion of equality which 
lacked the contextual analysis required by a substantive approach. 
 
In these ways, LeBel J.’s discussion of choice incorporated 
notions of formal equality into his analysis. It may be argued, 
however, that LeBel J.’s consideration of choice is preferred from a 
feminist perspective. This is because his emphasis on choice respects 
women’s autonomy to choose. Protecting autonomy and choice may 
be preferred in the context of, for example, rights to one’s body. 
However, such reasoning is problematic in the context of debating 
inclusion in support regimes. This is because women`s choices to 
enter the regime, as explained above, may be constrained or illusory, 
more so than that of their male counterparts.  
 
LeBel J.’s analysis of choice demonstrates the friction between 
Charter principles of autonomy, linked here with choice, and 
protecting the vulnerable.68 Such friction may be evident in the 
relative success of section 7 claims compared to the lack of success 
of equality claims under the Charter.69 This is because section 7 
claims may be associated more with autonomy, whereas section 15 
is often associated with protecting the vulnerable (such as those 
vulnerable to discrimination). The principle of autonomy is 
associated with the Court’s recent conception of the equality rights 
claimant as a self-interested neoliberal citizen resistant to 
government intervention in individual choices.70 Such a conception 
alienates those such as A, who may be burdened twice, first by 
lacking autonomy and thus being unable to make choices, and again, 
by being left unprotected by the Charter and family legislation. 
LeBel J. refused to find a violation of section 15 in order to protect 
                                                 
68  Busby, supra note 34. 
69  Jena McGill, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2013 Term” 
(2015) 68 SCLR (2nd) at 137.  
70  Busby, supra note 34.  
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the choice and autonomy of individuals to remain outside the 
regime. However, it may be argued that LeBel J.’s emphasis on 
choice, though tied to autonomy, failed to protect A’s individuality 
or autonomy. This is because by being excluded from the protective 
regime, A was left dependent on B’s financial decisions.  
 
The friction between the principles of autonomy and the 
protection of vulnerability reflects the clash between the different 
conceptions of equality motivating the Charter, in particular, formal 
and substantive equality.71 LeBel J.’s analysis, which incorporates 
notions of choice, autonomy and individualism, reflects notions of 
formal equality underlying the Charter. However, his analysis falls 
short in incorporating the Charter’s goals of substantive equality. 
From a feminist perspective, his analysis is lacking for his 
consideration of sameness and choice, associated here with formal 
equality. Instead, substantive equality requires a contextual analysis 
considering the different impacts of the exclusion on men and 
women in order to protect those more vulnerable to adverse effects.  
 
ABELLA J.’S DECISION 
 
Justice Abella held that the provisions infringed section 15 and were 
not justifiable under section 1. In contrast to LeBel J., justice Abella 
found a violation of section 15 without engaging in an analysis of 
prejudice and stereotyping. Instead, she found the provisions 
violated section 15 by perpetuating disadvantage. The disadvantage, 
in this case, was the exclusion of common law couples from the 
regime.  
 
Critique of Abella J.’s Reasoning  
 
This paper argues that Abella J.’s analysis is preferred from the 
perspective of feminist theories of substantive equality. This is 
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because Abella J., in contrast to LeBel J., moved past a standard of 
formal equality. Instead, she applied a substantive approach 
responsive to the feminist perspectives used as the standard in this 
paper. She did so in two ways. First, Abella J.’s formation of the 
section 15(1) test broadened it in a way which permitted a more 
contextualized analysis of discrimination. Second, in applying the 
test, Abella J. examined the different impacts of the provisions on 
men and women.  
 
 Abella J.’s formulation of the test for discrimination at section 
15 differed from more rigid versions of the test applied in past 
section 15 cases. Abella J. declared that prejudice and stereotyping 
were neither necessary nor “discrete elements” for finding 
discrimination under section 15.72 In doing so, Abella J. rendered 
consistent previous applications of the section 15(1) test in Kapp and 
Withler which appeared to require a prejudice and stereotyping 
analysis. She stated that the indicia of prejudice and stereotyping ask 
whether discriminatory attitudes exist. She stated that the focus 
should instead be on whether there is discriminatory impact on 
claimants, regardless of whether it is “unconsciously motivated.”73 
This eases the burden on claimants by refocusing on their actual 
situation rather than requiring them to bring evidence that the 
provision promotes negative attitudes.74 Abella J.’s definition of 
discrimination was in line with McIntyre J.’s original definition in 
Andrews. In Andrews, McIntyre J. defined discrimination as 
“distinctions…which involve,” and thus may not be limited to 
“prejudice or disadvantage.”75 It may be argued that, in framing the 
test this way, Abella J.’s strayed from prior section 15 cases. 
However, Abella J. herself, along with McLachlin C.J., stated in 
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Kapp that discrimination could be found through a perpetuation of 
“disadvantage or prejudice.”76 In moving past a rigid analysis of 
prejudice and stereotyping to a more general analysis of 
disadvantage, Abella J. continued a trend towards a more liberal 
section 15 test evident since Kapp and Withler’s abandonment of 
comparator group analysis and rigid application of the Law factors. 
 
 Abella J.’s formulation of the section 15(1) test for 
discrimination is preferred from the perspective of feminist theories 
of substantive equality for two reasons. First, it produced a test more 
conducive to protecting substantive equality. Mahoney notes that an 
analysis of disadvantage “is determined contextually by examining 
the group in the entire social, political, and legal fabric of our 
society.”77 This mirrors the contextual analysis associated with 
substantive equality.78 Applied to Quebec v. A., the test of 
disadvantage forced the Court to consider systemic disadvantages 
against women in common law relationships. Such considerations 
help motivate a finding that neutral legislation which assumes the 
sameness of men and women’s experiences of exclusion from the 
regime may in fact be more disadvantageous to women. Considering 
disadvantage, in this way, places the emphasis of the analysis on 
equality of outcomes, rather than merely equality of opportunity.79 
This may be more difficult if using only the indicia of prejudice and 
stereotyping which focus less on outcomes and more on the 
impugned provision itself.  
 
 Second, Abella J.’s formulation of the section 15(1) test for 
discrimination is preferred from the perspective of feminist theories 
of substantive equality because she refused to consider choice. In 
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doing so, Abella J. mirrored L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissent in Walsh.80 
Abella J. justified leaving choice out of the section 15 analysis by 
pointing to the recognition of marital status in Miron v. Trudel as an 
analogous ground.81 By recognizing marital status as an analogous 
ground, the Court in Miron identified its immutable nature. In doing 
so, it recognized that an individual may appear free to choose to 
marry, but their options may be limited by, for example, financial 
constraints or other factors out of their control.82 In the case at hand, 
such factors may include B’s rejection of the institution of marriage. 
Considering the choice to marry would disentitle claimants from the 
very protection afforded by the recognition of marital status as an 
analogous ground.83 Abella J. stated that although the Court 
considered choice at section 15 in Walsh, the test evolved since then 
significantly enough that Walsh no longer be followed. Abella J.’s 
refusal to consider choice corresponds with the feminist theories 
cited in this paper. This is because, in doing so, Abella J. recognized 
that women may face greater barriers to exercising choice than men 
due to their experiences of systemic discrimination. In this sense, her 
analysis differed from LeBel J.’s sameness approach because she 
recognized that women excluded from the regime may be impacted 
differently than men.  
 
 In addition to her formulation of the test, Abella J.’s application 
of it is preferred from the perspective of feminist theories of 
substantive equality for two reasons. First, in her analysis, Abella J. 
considered women’s experiences of dependence and vulnerability in 
common law relationships. As Lessard notes, women`s experiences 
of dependence are often ignored in legal analysis since they are 
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considered “legally irrelevant.”84 Lessard argues that notions of 
equality which ignore such private experiences fail to adequately 
protect the disadvantaged.85 Abella J. recognized the need to 
consider these experiences when evaluating the impact of their 
exclusion from the regime. Lessard notes that equality cases in 
which private experiences are devalued are characterized by a public 
/ private distinction.86 Abella J. moved past such a public / private 
split by examining women’s private experiences of vulnerability and 
dependence and using these as justifications in her legal analysis for 
striking down the exclusion.   
 
 Second, Abella J.’s analysis is preferred because she analyzed 
common law relationships for their content or substance.87 Abella J. 
found that common law couples are functionally similar to married 
couples by, for example, being equally economically integrated. 
This is akin to the Court’s analysis in cases on the rights of same-sex 
marriage claimants to inclusion in support regimes offered to 
heterosexual married couples. For example, in M v. H, the Court 
found that the exclusion of same-sex couples from aspects of the 
Ontario family support regime affecting unmarried cohabitants 
violated section 15.88 Same-sex couples were analyzed as 
substantively similar to other common law couples who were 
included in some parts of the Ontario support regime. Same-sex 
couples were thus included in the protective regimes. In the same 
vein, Abella J. emphasized the functional similarity of married and 
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unmarried cohabitants in deciding that they should be included in the 
regime. Further, Abella J. stated that the regime was formed to 
protect not the form of marriage, but the needs that arise from 
mutual obligations.89 She explained that married and unmarried 
cohabitants experience similar degrees of dependence in the 
relationship. As McLellan notes, support legislation is meant to 
protect people in a position of dependency.90 Thus, as she notes, 
excluding unmarried cohabitants may be an arbitrary exclusion 
without regard for actual dependency in such relationships.91 In 
effect, Abella J. considered the circumstances and context of 
common law couples, which she analogized to that of married 
couples. Her contextual analysis thus incorporated considerations of 
the feminist perspectives used in this paper. 
 
 In her analysis, Abella J. characterized the disadvantaged spouse 
in common law relationships as an economically vulnerable woman. 
This is in opposition to LeBel J.’s characterization of such claimants 
as autonomous individuals with the freedom to choose to remain 
outside the support regime. It may be argued that Abella J.’s 
characterization stereotypes or victimizes women in such 
relationships as “forever vulnerable and forever in need of 
protection.”92 However, Abella J.’s analysis was necessarily 
gendered (by analyzing the exclusion’s negative impact on women 
more than men). Such an analysis was necessary due to the gendered 
nature of the problem itself in which women more often than men 
are in a situation of economic dependence or vulnerability in 
common law relationships. As Majury notes, a gender-neutral 
solution, or one which ignores the different effects of the exclusion 
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on men and women, is not always appropriate for a gendered 
problem.93 Since Abella J. recognized that financial and social 
dependence in such relationships is a gendered problem because 
women often make up the class of economically vulnerable 
unmarried cohabitants, this justified her gendered analysis of 
associating women in such relationships with a lack of choice and 
autonomy. In contrast, in his analysis, LeBel J. disassociated A from 
her social and economic situation of lacking choice and autonomy in 
relation to B. As Munro notes, it is necessary to consider the 
individual in context, without “stripping them of the characteristics 
and relationships that influence their choices.”94 By considering the 
context of the claims, Abella J. analyzed not only the exclusion 
made by the provisions, but who benefitted by the exclusion and, 
critically, at the expense of whom. From her discussion, it appeared 
that the economically superior spouse, B, benefitted to the detriment 
of the economically vulnerable A. For these reasons, Abella J.’s 
analysis incorporated considerations of the exclusion’s impact on 
women. She adopted a contextual approach aware of women’s 
experiences of disadvantage. In doing so, Abella J.’s analysis was 
more responsive to feminist theories of substantive equality than that 
of LeBel J. 
 
DESCHAMPS J.’S DECISION 
 
Justice Deschamps agreed with Justices Abella and McLachlin in 
finding an infringement at section 15. However, she differed by 
upholding only the property provisions under section 1. At section 
15, Deschamps J. used the flexible test of disadvantage applied by 
justice Abella. She also incorporated a contextual analysis similar to 
Abella J. by considering A’s claims in the context of systemic 
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barriers to women in common law relationships which place them at 
a greater disadvantage than men when excluded from the support 
regime.  
 
Critique of Deschamps J.’s Reasoning  
 
When measured against the standard of feminist theories of 
substantive equality, Deschamps J.’s analysis is preferred over 
LeBel J.’s analysis for her use of a more flexible section 15(1) test 
and her consideration of the different impacts of the exclusion on 
men and women. However, Deschamps J.’s analysis is not preferred 
over justice Abella’s. This is because of the way in which 
Deschamps J. separated her analysis of the spousal support and 
property provisions and decided to strike down only the former.  
 
 Deschamps J. differentiated between spousal support and the 
division of property. She found that spouses become economically 
dependent over time without having consent or control in the matter. 
She stated that this lack of consent or control necessitated the 
inclusion of unmarried cohabitants in the spousal support regime.95 
In contrast, she found that the accumulation of property can be 
characterized as a “conscious act” in which parties exercise a greater 
degree of consent.96  
 
 From the feminist perspectives used in this paper, Deschamps 
J.’s decision to uphold the property provisions and strike down the 
spousal support provisions is inconsistent. Deschamps J. applied a 
contextual analysis to striking down spousal support. She did so by 
emphasizing the need to protect economically vulnerable common 
law women excluded from the support regime. Yet, she deviated 
from this reasoning in upholding the property provisions. It can be 
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argued that, in the context of her analysis on the property provisions, 
Deschamps J. gave more weight to notions of formal equality such 
as autonomy and choice than notions of substantive equality. This is 
because she assumed the autonomy and choice of individuals in 
accumulating property. This is contrast to her discussion of the 
spousal support provisions in which she recognized that autonomy 
or choice may be illusory. It may be argued that the “conscious act” 
and greater degree of consent she correlated with property 
accumulation are also illusory. It may be argued that the exclusion 
from property is characterized by the same lack of consent that she 
recognized in considering the spousal support provisions. This 
suggests that including unmarried cohabitants in the regime may be 
needed to account for the actual lack of consent and control faced by 
women in both scenarios. In this sense, analyzing such factors only 
in relation to the exclusion from spousal support, instead of 
considering such factors in the analysis of both spousal support and 
property, may be inconsistent. For these reasons, standards used in 
this paper may require that, in contrast to Deschamps J.’s reasoning, 
the exclusion from spousal support and property both be struck 
down.  
 
MCLACHLIN C.J.’S DECISION  
 
Chief justice McLachlin departed from the majority on section 15 by 
upholding the provisions under section 1. At section 15, McLachlin 
C.J. mirrored LeBel J. in indicating that factors other than prejudice 
and stereotyping, such as disadvantage alone, could be used in 
finding discrimination. She did so by describing prejudice and 
stereotyping as “useful” but seemingly unnecessary “guides.”97 
However, McLachlin C.J. proceeded to apply prejudice and 
stereotyping in her analysis and found that the provisions 
perpetuated both. As Bala and Leckey note, it may be disconcerting 
that McLachlin C.J. found both stereotyping and disadvantage and 
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thus recognized the severity of the discrimination, but nonetheless 
upheld the provisions at section 1.98 McLachlin C.J. also deviated 
from her colleagues by incorporating an analysis of the reasonable 
person at section 15. In doing so, she asked whether the impugned 
provisions were discriminatory from the point of view of the 
reasonable person.99  
 
Critique of McLachlin C.J.’s Reasoning  
 
Measured against the theories used in this paper, McLachlin C.J.’s 
analysis is not preferred due to the way in which she applied the 
section 15(1) discrimination test from the point of view of the 
reasonable person. It is not preferred for the two reasons outlined 
below.  
 
 First, as Moran notes, the reasonable person test is criticised 
from a feminist perspective for having a tendency to frame the 
reasonable person as the reasonable man.100 The standard thus results 
in comparing women claimants to a reasonable man who may not be 
subject to the same systemic discrimination faced by women. The 
reasonable person test, in this way, has the potential to presume a 
level playing field or sameness of experiences among men and 
women. This is problematic because a section 15 claimant may 
require a more contextual analysis that takes into account their 
history of disadvantage which prevents them from being at a level 
playing field. The reasonable person test may be tied to formal 
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equality because it assumes sameness without considering barriers to 
sameness. The test of the reasonable person, then, may run counter 
to conceptions of substantive equality which criticize a sameness 
analysis.   
 
 Second, the reasonable person test runs the risk of implicitly 
framing the reasonable person as a neoliberal individual with greater 
autonomy and choice than is the reality for some economically 
vulnerable spouses. This is problematic because the reasonable 
person, as an individual with greater choice and autonomy, may not 
be impacted by the impugned provisions the same way as those with 
less choice and independence. McLachlin C.J. stated that she applied 
the test of a reasonable person “possessed of similar attributes to, 
and under similar circumstances as, the claimant.”101 This suggests 
that she recognized the need for a more contextual analysis of the 
circumstances of claimants, such as women’s systemic 
disadvantages which constrain their ability to exercise choice and 
autonomy in common law relationships. However, comparing the 
claimant to a reasonable person still imposes another barrier to 
establishing a violation of equality rights which is still inappropriate 
even if a contextualized version of the reasonable person is 
considered.  
 
 The concept of the reasonable person is misplaced in the section 
15 analysis and equality cases in general. The equality rights 
claimant may not be on the same footing as the average reasonable 
person. In this sense, the use of the standard of the reasonable person 
is problematic regardless of whether or not the claimant is a man. 
Section 15 claimants are often not similarly situated to the average 
person in a social, cultural, socio-economic or other sense. In 
assuming sameness, the reasonable person test may fail to consider 
systemic discrimination that prevents individuals from being on 
equal footing. For these reasons, McLachlin C.J.’s use of the 
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reasonable person in her section 15 analysis is inappropriate and 
problematic when measured against feminist perspectives of 





When measured against the standards used in this paper, LeBel J.’s 
analysis is undesirable because of the way in which his 
considerations of sameness and choice are tied to formal equality. 
Deschamps J.’s analysis is objectionable because her analysis of the 
spousal support and property provisions is inconsistent from a 
feminist perspective. McLachlin C.J.’s analysis is not preferred 
because of the way in which she incorporated the test of the 
reasonable person into section 15. Abella J. most effectively 
incorporated a consideration of the ways in which women in 
common law relationships may be more disadvantaged by the 
exclusion from the support regime than men. Her analysis reflects 
the contextual analysis associated with the standard used in this 
paper. In keeping with feminist theories of substantive equality, 
Abella J. moved past sameness to consider what prevents individuals 
from being treated the same in society and by the law.
